Chevron Deference to the USPTO at the Federal Circuit by Field, Thomas G., Jr.
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
1-1-2002
Chevron Deference to the USPTO at the Federal
Circuit
Thomas G. Field Jr.
Franklin Pierce Law Center
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Field, Thomas G. Jr., "Chevron Deference to the USPTO at the Federal Circuit" (2002). Law Faculty Scholarship. 397.
https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub/397
Chevron  Deference to the USPTO at the Federal Circuit *
Courts have long deferred to agency views of law,1 but they have also often
refused. The Federal Circuit, too, defers on some occasions but not others. This
paper examines the apparent inconsistency in its cases.
Chevron and Closely-Related Supreme Court Decisions
In oft-cited Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,2 the Supreme Court held: “[T]he Court of Appeals misconceived the nature
of its role…. Once it determined… that Congress did not actually have an intent
regarding the… [meaning of statutory language], the question before it was…
whether the Administrator’s view… is a reasonable one.”3 Continuing, the Court
said:
[T]he Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to
accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of
specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously
desired the Administrator to strike the balance…; perhaps it simply did
not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable
to forge a coalition on either side…. [I]t matters not which of these
things occurred.4
* By Thomas G. Field, Jr., Franklin Pierce Law Center. Professor Field thanks  Richard Brown,
Franklin Pierce ‘01 J.D. class, for able assistance and my colleague Bill Hennessey for  comments
regarding the status of PCT rules.
This article was  published as part XI of Conflicts in Federal Circuit Patent Law Decisions,
11 Fed. Circuit B.J. 723, at 773-77 (2002).
1 See In re Rubinfield, 270 F.2d 391 (CCPA 1959) (discussed below). 
2  467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Id.  at 845 (citations omitted).
4 Id.  at 865 (citations omitted).
There, neither the agency’s process nor the scope of its authority was seriously
questioned. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,5 however, because both were found
lacking, the Court refused deference.6 First, it held that an “exercise of quasi-
legislative authority… must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress
and subject to limitations which that body imposes.”7 Moreover, it held that
“the promulgation of these regulations must conform with any procedural
requirements imposed by Congress.”8
Christensen v. Harris County9 echoes such limitations. Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority, held, at, that “an interpretation contained in an opinion
letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking”10 to warrant no Chevron deference. Rather, he looked to
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.11 Ironically, Justice Scalia most strongly disputed the
point, arguing at , that agency processes became irrelevant after Chevron.12 Yet,
finding the agency’s interpretation unreasonable, he concurred in the judgment.
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Breyer
separately dissented, joined by Ginsburg. The entire Court agreed that the
agency’s opinion warranted respect. Justice Breyer’s opinion did not object to the
majority’s citing Skidmore instead of Chevron and said that “I do disagree with
Justice Scalia’s statement that what he calls ‘Skidmore  deference’ is ‘an
anachronism’.”13 Yet, Chrysler was neither cited nor discussed in Chevron or
Christensen.
5 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
6 But for Justice Marshall’s concurrence on a different point, the Court was unanimous. Id.
7 Id.  at 302.
8 Id.  at 303.
9 520 U.S. 576 (2000).
10 Id.  at 587.
11 323 U.S. 134 (1944)
12 Christensen, 520 U.S. at 589-90.
13 Id.  at at 596.
One further case that warrants note is Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.14 There a unanimous Court held:
In short, nothing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances of this case,
the nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the
statutory mandate under which the [agency] operates permitted the
[D.C. Circuit] to review and overturn… on the basis of the procedural
devices employed (or not employed) by the [agency] so long as [it]
employed at least the statutory minima, a matter about which there is
no doubt in this case.15
Vermont Yankee offers an additional basis for deference,16 particularly because
agencies’ procedural rules are exempt from notice and comment rulemaking.17
Apparent Inconsistency in Chevron Deference
The issue then is: When has the the Federal Circuit accorded deference and
when merely respected PTO views? Few Federal Circuit opinions have explicitly
discussed Chevron. Three accord explicit deference, but four refuse. Also, several
cases accept or reject PTO views without citing Chevron.18 Such decisions could
be seen as conflicting.
Judge Nies’ opinion in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler19 stands out for its
analysis. Nies wrote:20
14 435 U.S. 519 (Fed. Cir. 1978).
15 Id.  at 549.
16 The outcome was based in part on U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224,
246 (1973) (upholding the validity of agency procedures consistent with its statute, the
Administrative Procedure Act and prior decisions of the Court). See also,  Chemical Waste Mgmt.,
Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (explicitly applying Chevron to EPA’s
interpretation of its procedural requirements).
17 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
18 See, e.g.,  Patlex Corp.  v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480, 487 (FEd. Cir. 1985) (upholding
USPTO rules but citing other authority for invalidating Manual of Patent Examining Procedures
(MPEP) reexamination provisions).
19 80 F.3d 1543 (1996)
20 The current equivalent of 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994) is 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp.
V 1999) and, arguably, § 2(b)(2)(C). Judge Nies had no reason, of  course to consider § 31
(repealed Nov. 29, 1999), since replaced by § 2(b)(2)(D), which seems to represent an explicit grant
of substantive authority. It is unclear what, if any, effect new § 2(b)(2)(B) will have, but it is difficult
[T]he broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers — 6(a) —
authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only
to “the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]”; it does not grant the
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules. Because
Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive
rulemaking power, the “Final Determination” at issue in this case
cannot possibly have the “force and effect of law.” Thus, the rule of
controlling deference set forth in Chevron  does not apply. Such
deference as we owe… [arises from the USPTO’s] power to persuade if
lacking power to control.21
Offering several reasons to believe that Congress intended different results, the
panel construed 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 and 156 contrary to USPTO views. Although
the issue was not discussed, it may also be significant that the agency’s views
appeared in a notice, rather than after “formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking”22
Remaining cases explicitly refusing Chevron  deference are Ethicon v.
Quigg,23 Glaxo Operations, UK, Ltd. v. Quigg,24 and Helfgott & Karas, P.C.
v. Dickenson.25 In each case, Chevron deference was denied when the USPTO’s
positions were found incompatible with controlling statutes or a treaty obligation.
In contrast, Federal Circuit decisions that accord deference are difficult to
distinguish from pre-Chevron  CCPA opinions. For example, in In re
Rubinfield,26 Judge Worley wrote: “We find no sound reason for disturbing the
long-standing practice of the Patent Office, embodied in Rule 153, which limits
to see it to confer general substantive authority, standing alone.
21 Merck, 80 F.3d at1549–50 (citations omitted).
22 Christensen, 520 U.S. 587.
23 849 F.2d 1422, 1425–26 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to uphold an MPEP provision calling for
suspended reexamination during infringement litigation).
24 894 F.2d 392, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing a refused extension under 35 U.S.C. § 156).
25 209 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of a petition in light of  PCT Rule
91.1).
26 270 F.2d 391 (CCPA 1959).
design applications to a single claim.”27
The first to accord Chevron deference, Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843
(1989), applied it via Ethicon, supra. At 848, Judge Friedman wrote:
The Commissioner… is primarily responsible for the application and
enforcement of these narrow technical and specialized statutory and
regulatory provisions…. His interpretation… is entitled to considerable
deference.
Yet, “considerable deference” seems unnecessary where appellant apparently
offered no “sound reason” to disagree with the Commissioner’s perceived lack of
authority to revive an application lost for failure to appeal an adverse court
decision.
In the second case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document
Management Products Co.,28 Judge Michel wrote: “[T]o uphold the agency’s
interpretation, the court need not conclude that it was the only permissible
construction or even the construction the court would have reached…. The
agency’s interpretation must merely be ‘reasonable.’”29 Again, despite the quoted
language, however, no basis was offered for regarding the question as close.
Likewise, in Kubota v. Shibuya,30 while Judge Lourie cited Morganroth to credit
USPTO views of 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.633 and 1.655(a), nothing suggesting otherwise
seemed applicable given intervening, apparently uncontested, rule changes.
Indeed, all panels citing Chevron as a basis for deference apparently could
have reached the same result under Skidmore or simply for lack of good reason to
hold otherwise.31
27 Id.  at 396. However, it seems noteworthy that the Court also found the Patent Office’s
attempt to limit the number of illustrated embodiments unreasonable. Id.  at 395–96.
28 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
29 Id.  at 1571.
30 999 F.2d 517, 521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
31 See, e.g.,  In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937 (CCPA 1982) (passim).
The Bottom Line
Too much may be made of Chevron, particularly given ambiguity in
Supreme Court decisions. Despite the limited USPTO authority as articulated in
Merck,32 why would the Federal Circuit reverse in the absence of compelling
reasons? For example, in Oddzon Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,33 despite the
implicit lack of need to cite Chevron, the Court held: “Although the PTO’s
interpretation of [§ 102(f)] is not conclusive… it is [] reasonable…. It is sometimes
more important that a close question be settled one way or another than which way
it is settled.”34
32 See supra  note 7.
33 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
34 Id.  at  1403.
